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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether a fiscal sustainability 
indicator (FSI) can be used as a leading indicator to predict currency crises. 
Firstly, the sustainability of the fiscal policy in 17 developing countries is 
analysed using a FSI developed by Croce and Juan-Ramón (2003). Then, 
the FSI is evaluated in order to help predict currency crises. Using a non-
linear Markov-switching model, and applying the Gibbs sampling 
approach, it is found that the FSI influences the probability of entering a 
currency crisis period. Also, in the absence of official definitions for 
currency crises, different definitions are used to evaluate whether they 
induce different results in the analysis. In general, the results highlight how 
an unsustainable fiscal position leads to the eventual collapse of the 
exchange rate in some developing countries. 
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Resumen 
 
El propósito de este trabajo es investigar si un indicador de 
sostenibilidad fiscal (FSI) puede ser utilizado como indicador líder para 
predecir crisis cambiarias. Para evaluar esto, en primer lugar, se analiza la 
sostenibilidad de la política fiscal en 17 países en desarrollo, utilizando el 
indicador de sostenibilidad fiscal desarrollado por Croce y Juan-Ramón 
(2003). Luego, se utiliza un modelo de Markov con cambio de régimen, 
aplicando el método de muestreo de Gibbs, para evaluar si el FSI  ayuda a 
predecir crisis cambiarias. Los resultados sugieren que el FSI influye en la 
probabilidad de entrar en un período de crisis cambiarias. Asimismo, en 
ausencia de una definición oficial de crisis cambiarias, se usan distintas 
definiciones con el fin de evaluar si las mismas inducen a diferentes 
resultados. En general, los resultados ponen de manifiesto cómo una 
situación fiscal insostenible conduce a un eventual colapso del tipo de 
cambio en algunos países en desarrollo. 
 
Palabras clave: Crisis cambiaria, tipo de cambio, sostenibilidad fiscal.  
 
Clasificación JEL: F31, F33, E62 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Exchange rate collapses and currency crises in developing countries have been 
the two main subjects in international macroeconomics in the last two decades. 
Consequently, there has been a resurgence of interest in the early warning systems 
that can anticipate the occurrence of currency crises. The key to crisis prevention is 
the early recognition of economic vulnerability to currency crises. Therefore, it is 
desirable to identify some indicators of vulnerability in order to avert these crises. 
Some of the recent literatures on the early warning systems (EWS) for currency crises 
employ leading indicators such as the stock market, sovereign ratings, among others. 
However, does a fiscal sustainability indicator (FSI) really predict currency crises? 
Unfortunately, the literature on the subject has paid little attention to the role of FSIs 
in assessing the probability of currency crises. 
 
The aim of this paper is to assess whether a Fiscal Sustainability Indicator can 
be used as a leading indicator in predicting currency crises. To do that, the alternative 
approach proposed by Croce and Juan-Ramón (2003) is employed to measure the 
fiscal sustainability of each country. Then the Markov-switching model introduced by 
Albert and Chib (1993), and applying a Gibbs sampling approach is used to evaluate 
if the Fiscal Sustainability Indicator influences the transition probability of 
experiencing currency crises. In this sense, the two regimes are defined in the 
following ways: a tranquil regime as the regime with the smallest mean and a crisis 
regime as the regime with the highest mean. 
 
In addition, two empirical definitions of currency crises are employed. Firstly, 
a crisis is defined as nominal currency depreciation. Secondly, an exchange market 
pressure index is constructed as an indicator of currency crises. This indicator is 
calculated by computing a weighted average of the nominal depreciation rate, the 
change in interest rates and international reserves using the United States as the 
country of reference. The quarter in which the index exceeds a certain threshold is 
taken to be the crisis period. Finally, from previously mentioned definitions, two 
binary definitions of currency crises are constructed. 
 
Quarterly data for a sample of the following 17 developing countries is 
presented: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, the 
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, Hungary, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Peru, Philippines, Thailand and Turkey. This selection of countries has been dictated 
by data availability. Fiscal policy was also a relevant criterion in terms of public debt 
and composition and variability of public expenditures in the sample. Most of these 
countries have experienced episodes of currency crises in the period 1990-2004. 
Therefore the countries and the period considered provide a good sample to test our 
hypothesis. It should be emphasised that this paper does not intend to give a detailed 
overview of the causes and unfolding of currency crises; instead it concentrates 
primarily on highlighting if the FSI helps to predict currency crises. 
 
The result from a time-varying transition probability (TVTP) Markov-
switching model reveals that the inclusion of a Fiscal Sustainability Indicator in the 
transition probabilities improves the conditional probabilities of a currency crisis.  
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The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 provides a brief 
review of the literature discussing the fiscal roots of currency crises. Section 3 
presents different definitions of currency crises. Section 4 discusses Fiscal 
Sustainability Indicators and presenting a framework for the TVTP Markov-switching 
models. Section 5 describes the sets of data obtained. Section 6 presents estimated 
results and an analysis of these. Finally, Section 7 presents the concluding remarks. 
 
II. THE ROLE OF FISCAL POLICY IN CURRENCY CRISES: A 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
Existing literature on currency crises distinguishes between several types of 
crises according to their causes, fundamentally classifying them into three generations 
of crises models. The first generation models, called speculative attack models, focus 
on macroeconomic imbalances (Krugman, 1979, 1996; Flood and Garber, 1984; 
Flood and Marion, 1996). The second generation models accentuate the self-fulfilling 
characteristics of a currency crisis and the occurrence of multiple equilibriums 
(Obstfeld, 1986, 1996; Rangvid, 2001). Finally, third generation models stress the 
consequences of moral hazards in the banking system and the contagion effect as key 
determinants of a currency crisis (Chang and Velasco, 2001). Most of the literature on 
currency crises focuses on the role of monetary policy in a crisis. However, 
theoretical and empirical literature on currency crises provides a useful framework for 
the analysis of fiscal causes.  
 
First generation models indicate that an inadequate macroeconomic policy is 
the main cause of currency crises. According to Krugman (1979), one of the 
longstanding explanations of currency crises is that they result from immoderate fiscal 
policies. Inconsistencies between fiscal policy fundamentals and exchange rate 
regimes lead to the abandonment of certain exchange rate regimes (usually the fixed 
exchange rate). The idea is that a large monetized budget deficit is accompanied by a 
gradual fall in foreign reserves, and that when the level of foreign reserves becomes 
low enough, a speculative attack on the currency occurs. At this point speculators 
purchase the remaining amount of international reserves, forcing the central bank to 
change the exchange rate regime. Krugman (1979) claims that a currency crisis is 
caused by a large budget deficit that is financed by credit expansion.  
 
Similarly, Van Wijnbergen (1991) demonstrates how the resulting fiscal 
inconsistencies lead to international reserve losses and forced devaluations as well as 
subsequent permanent increases in inflation. This author argues that external shocks 
can destroy consistency between fiscal programmes and inflation targets, causing 
foreign reserve losses, exchange rate changes and higher inflation. As a consequence, 
the balance of payments crises provide the mechanism through which fiscal 
imbalances translate into higher inflation rates. Contrary to the analysis presented in 
the literature covering early speculative attacks, a domestic credit policy designed to 
prevent international reserve losses during a stabilisation programme is shown to be 
insufficient in preventing speculative attacks under fixed exchange rate regimes.  
 
Recent contributions in the analysis of the fiscal dimension of a currency crisis 
in light of first generation models come from Daniel (2001); Corsetti and Mackowiak 
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(2005, 2006); Burnside et al. (2003, 2006); among others1. Daniel (2001) analyses the 
role of fiscal policy in generating exchange rate crises showing that a currency crisis 
occurs when the fiscal authority allows the present value of primary surpluses, 
inclusive of seigniorage, to differ from the current value of government debt at the 
pegged exchange rate. Once fiscal policy violates the constraints imposed by a fixed 
exchange rate regime, there is no monetary policy consistent with the long-run 
viability of such regime. Similarly, Corsetti and Mackowiak (2005) construct a 
framework in order to study currency crises associated with fiscal imbalances. In 
contrast with most of the literature on speculative attacks and currency collapses, they 
find that the composition of public liabilities is a key determinant in the 
macroeconomic dynamics surrounding a crisis, as well as the magnitude of exchange 
rate adjustments in fiscal imbalances. In the same way, Corsetti and Mackowiak 
(2006) present a simple framework to analyse the fiscal dimension of a currency 
crisis. Their analysis can be summarised as follows, with the expansion of domestic 
credit and seigniorage revenues being a sideshow, a fiscal imbalance can cause the 
abandonment of a currency peg independently of any need for seigniorage revenues. 
Their work also illustrates how fiscal and interest rate policies interact to determine 
the magnitude and the timing of speculative attacks and devaluations. Moreover, 
Burnside et al. (2003, 2006) use a general equilibrium model in which prospective 
government deficits trigger a currency crisis, and explore the implications of different 
strategies for financing the fiscal costs associated with a currency crisis for inflation 
and depreciation rates.  
 
To explain crises in light of second generation models some authors identify 
changed expectations as the main cause of a currency crisis. These models focus on 
the role of government choice in setting policy and in the potentially self-fulfilling 
nature of expectations in using models with multiple equilibria2. These models also 
emphasise how large scale capital inflows (often attracted by a speculative bubble) 
turn into pre-crisis outflows. Therefore, crises may occur without the worsening of 
fundamentals and without inconsistent policies. Attacks on the currency are prompted 
by a shift in investor sentiment, that is, a shift in market expectations from a good to 
bad equilibrium (Obstfeld, 1996). The attack takes place when investors obtain new 
information that the government's net liabilities exceed a threshold, or when the 
government decides to extract seignorage, instead of embarking on a fiscal 
adjustment, to meet intertemporal budget constraints. In other words, the immediate 
cause of a crisis is the signalling that the government can only resolve policy 
inconsistencies by abandoning exchange rate rules rather than attempting to contain 
public sector imbalances. Daniel (1997) provides an alternative model to the self-
fulfilling crisis explanation for episodes of exchange rate collapses, arguing that 
instantaneous collapses in exchange rate regimes can be the result of a policy that 
increases the government's reliance on seigniorage revenues. His work addresses the 
predictability of exchange rate crises and finds that it is empirically difficult to 
attribute some recent exchange rate regime collapses to a preceding period of 
unsustainable government policies. 
 
On the other hand, some authors attempt to identify the fiscal roots of major 
currency crises using third generation models. These models introduce the role of 
                                                 
1 These contributions are sometimes viewed as an alternative to the Krugman model. 
2 The existence of multiple equilibriums has been questioned, under specific conditions, by Krugman 
(1996). 
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moral hazards as a cause for excessive borrowing. The moral hazards based models 
stress the role played by government bailout promises in determining excessive risk-
taking by financial intermediaries. Here, a sudden loss of confidence triggers a twin 
crisis, combining banking and currency problems, once maturity and currency 
mismatches in banking balance sheets enter a zone of vulnerability. The idea is that, a 
banking system crisis will lead to a currency crisis using the first generation model 
mechanism, because government contingent liabilities (implicit guarantees) become 
commitments in the moments of crisis and result in unsustainable fiscal deficits, with 
central banks as lenders of last resort. However, the measures taken are inconsistent 
with the maintenance of fixed exchange rates. Marini and Piersanti (2003) use an 
optimising general equilibrium model to investigate currency and financial crises in 
emerging markets. They show that a rise in current and expected future budget 
deficits generates a real exchange rate appreciation and a depletion of foreign 
reserves, leading to a currency crisis when reserves decline below critical levels. 
Similarly, Burnside et al. (2000) explain currency crises as the consequence of 
expected future budget deficits brought about by the implicit bailout promise for 
failing banking systems. 
 
In this line of study, Nashashibi and Bazzoni (1993) investigate a sample of 28 
sub-Saharan African countries in the period 1980-1991. They find that in those 
countries where the tax base is highly dependent on imports and import substitutes, 
exchange rate movements in response to external shocks are critical in sustaining and 
improving fiscal performances. Eichengreen et al. (1994) present an empirical 
analysis of speculative attacks on pegged exchange rates in 22 countries between 
1967 and 1992. They find that there are links between budget deficits, public debt and 
the probability of a crisis but only in the non-Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) 
sample. Contrary, Frankel and Rose (1996) using panel data, for over 100 developing 
countries from 1971 to 1992, show that fiscal deficits tend to be small and shrinking 
in countries experiencing a crisis. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) examine currency 
and banking crises episodes in 20 countries (industrial and developing) for the period 
1970-1995. They find that fiscal deficits tend to be higher in the two years preceding a 
currency crisis, compared to tranquil periods. Similarly, Aziz et al. (2000) seek to 
identify common characteristics among a variety of macroeconomic and financial 
variables for a large sample of currency crises in industrial and emerging countries 
between 1975 and 1997. They find that fiscal deficits tend to be, on average, larger 
two years before the crisis occurs across the whole sample.  
 
Siwinska (2000) conducted a comparative analysis related to the fiscal 
imbalances leading to currency crises. She examined the behaviour of a number of 
fiscal variables before and during the crisis, compared to tranquil episodes, in 50 
developing and transition countries for the period of 1980-1999. For both developing 
and transition economies, the crisis was preceded by larger than normal fiscal deficits 
and a higher level of public debt. Additionally, Bird and Mandilaras (2006) find that 
fiscal imbalances have a significant effect on pressures in the foreign exchange 
market in Latin American and Caribbean countries but not in the East Asian and 
Pacific countries. Similarly, Mandilaras and Bird (2008) use panel data (LSDV) and 
generalised methods of moments (GMM) for 28 Latin American and Caribbean 
countries showing that accumulated debts increase the pressures in the foreign 
exchange market.  
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On the other hand, there have been numerous empirical studies on currency 
crises, which attempt to deduce the leading indicators that would make currency 
crises more predictable. Some researchers use exchange rate expectations, 
overvaluation of currency, and capital controls, among others, as predictors of 
currency crises (Goldfajn and Valdés, 1997; Burkart and Coudert, 2002). Other 
studies use stock market and sovereign ratings as leading indicators of currency crises 
(Broome and Morley, 2004; Sy, 2004). Some of the studies listed employ more than 
one methodology. However, none of the aforementioned papers considers a Fiscal 
Sustainability Indicator. 
 
The next section introduces the different currency crisis definitions employed 
in this paper. 
 
III.  DEFINING CURRENCY CRISES   
 
The definition of a currency crisis is of paramount importance in the process 
of identifying the leading indicators for predicting a crisis. Several approaches exist in 
the literature reviewed. In some theoretical works a currency crisis is predominantly 
defined only in the case of fixed exchange regimes, usually as the official devaluation 
or abandonment of the fixed exchange rate regime. However, this definition is not 
flexible enough to use in empirical studies.  
 
Other empirical studies define a currency crisis as a large (either nominal or 
real) devaluation or depreciation of the domestic currency. However, this last 
definition does not consider that monetary authorities can fight a speculative attack by 
intervening in the foreign exchange market or by increasing interest rates. In these 
circumstances, a currency crisis (defined as a speculative attack) may not lead to an 
actual devaluation. As a consequence, unsuccessful speculative attacks should be 
included in the definition of a currency crisis since they point to the vulnerability of 
the system as seen in a fall in international reserves and a rise in interest rates (Girton 
and Roper, 1977; Eichengreen et al., 1996). This paper employs different 
methodologies to define a currency crisis and compares their results. Firstly, an 
indicator is constructed based on the movements in nominal exchange rates according 
to the definition of currency crisis proposed by Frankel and Rose (1996). This 
definition of a currency crisis only encompasses currency devaluation without a 
decrease in international reserves or an increase in interest rates. We define a crisis as 
a nominal depreciation of the domestic currency in any quarter greater than 6%, but it 
also has to exceed the previous year's depreciation level by at least 10%3. In other 
words, this definition assumes that there are only successful speculative attacks. This 
definition is utilised to create a binary variable, a crisis indicator called Exchange 
Rate Depreciation (ERD), equal to one if a crisis occurs and equal to zero otherwise. 
 
Secondly, a definition of a currency crisis is used to refer to an intense 
increase in speculative pressure on the country's currency. Therefore, the measure of 
exchange rate pressure (MPI) developed by Girton and Roper (1977) and modified by 
Eichengreen et al. (1996) is used. The idea being that a successful speculative attack 
                                                 
3 This definition is according to the definitions of currency crises given by Frankel and Rose (1996), 
which is a depreciation of the exchange rate greater than 25% in any given year. 
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on a currency would show up in a change in the exchange rate, but that monetary 
authorities can fend off these attacks either by raising interest rates or by selling off 
international reserves. The advantage of using this index is that both successful and 
unsuccessful attacks on a currency can be asserted. Then, a given episode can be 
classified as a speculative attack or crisis period if the MPI is greater in value than 1.5 
standard deviations over the country's own mean value. Mean values and standard 
deviations are country-specific. As a consequence, the binary variable is used, 
identifying the speculative attack regime in the sample4. 
 
Finally, currency crises are defined employing the Markov-switching 
approach (with time-varying transition probabilities). The parameters estimated with 
this method and the data reveal the period of crisis in an economy. 
 
The next section presents the theoretical framework to evaluate the 
effectiveness of a fiscal sustainability indicator in predicting a currency crisis. 
 
IV.  METHODOLOGY   
 
This section is divided into two sub-sections. The first sub-section, based on 
Croce and Juan-Ramón (2003), presents a recursive algorithm derived from the law of 
motion of the debt to GDP ratio to analyse the sustainability of fiscal policy. Finally, a 
Markov-switching model (with time-varying transition probabilities) is introduced. 
4.1 Establishing Government Fiscal Sustainability  
 
To evaluate fiscal sustainability, this paper uses the recursive algorithm 
developed by Croce and Juan-Ramón (2003). In order to derive a simple expression 
for the index of fiscal sustainability, it is assumed that the debt ratio (debt to GDP) at 
time 1t −  is higher than the long-term objective for that ratio ( )*1td d− > . Hence td  
would converge to *d , if and only if 1t tβ λ− < , in which td  is public debt as a 
proportion of GDP (the law of motion in the debt to GDP ratio), *d  is the target debt 
ratio, and 1
1
t
t
r
g
β += + ,  tr  is the real interest rate and tg  denotes the rate of growth of 
real output. The parameter tλ  indicates the intensity of the policy response at time t, 
given the debt ratio gap in the previous period. Therefore, we can use ( )t tβ λ−  as an 
indicator of fiscal sustainability5. An alternative expression for the Fiscal 
Sustainability Indicator (FSI) is accordingly: 
  
 ( ) **
1
1
1
t t
t t t
t t
r ps psFSI
g d d
β λ
−
⎛ ⎞+ −= − = −⎜ ⎟+ −⎝ ⎠
 (1) 
 
                                                 
4 However, a major drawback in this approach is that the weights, as well as the threshold value used to 
identify the speculative attacks, are somewhat arbitrary. 
5 For a detailed demonstration see Croce and Juan-Ramón (2003). 
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where tps  is the ratio of the primary surplus to GDP. This expression states that a 
persistently higher spread between the observed real interest rate and the observed 
growth rate of real GDP would, other than being equal, lead to higher public 
indebtedness (high parameter tβ )6. The second parameter ( tλ ), measures the ratio 
between the deviation of observed and target values of the primary surplus and public 
debt ratios. In addition, a fiscal position would be sustainable if 1tFSI < . In contrast, 
if 1tFSI ≥  then the fiscal position is unsustainable. 
 
The following sub-section presents the framework for the TVTP Markov-switching 
model.  
 
4.2 Markov-Switching Model of Crises with Endogenous Transition Probabilities 
 
To evaluate the usefulness of a leading indicator in predicting a currency 
crisis, a Markov-switching model is fitted along the lines of Filardo and Gordon 
(1998). Building on Hamilton (1989) the fixed transition probability matrix 
assumption is relaxed, allowing the probability to vary with economic fundamentals7. 
The model with time-varying transition probabilities is obtained by: 
 
 ( )20 1 1 1 ,            0,t t t p t p t tY S X X Nα α φ φ ε ε σ− −= + + + + +" ∼  (2) 
 
where tY  denotes a change in the domestic exchange market, 0α  and 1α  are scalar 
parameters, tX  is a vector of variables that influences the level of tY , and tε  is a 
white noise disturbance term. Following the specifications of Filardo and Gordon 
(1998), a probit function is defined and incorporated to measure the transition 
probability matrix at each time t . This way, the transition probabilities are a function 
of an economic indicator variable such as the Fiscal Sustainability Indicator, so that 
the probabilities are always between 0 and 1. 
 
The time-varying transition probabilities can be expressed as: 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )1 1
1
| ,
1
t t
t t t t t
t t
q z p z
P S s S s z
q z p z− −
−⎡ ⎤= = = ⎢ ⎥−⎣ ⎦
 (3) 
and 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
*
*
1 0
0 0
t t
t t
P S P S
P S P S
= = ≥
= = <  (4) 
 
where *tS  is a latent variable defined by the following equation: 
 
                                                 
6 For mature stable economies the expected value β  should be about 1, higher than 1 for economies 
with relative scarce capital and high financial intermediation costs, and much higher than 1 and more 
volatile in contexts of economic and political uncertainty. 
7 The time-varying transition probabilities model allows the transition probabilities to rise just before a 
crisis or tranquil period begins, while the fixed transition probabilities model does not (Filardo, 1994). 
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 * '0 1t z t s t tS z S uγ γ γ −= + + +  (5) 
 
in which { }1, , ,t t t t nz z z z− −= …  is a vector of the variables that influence the transition 
probabilities with corresponding factor-loading determined by the zγ  vector of 
parameters, 0γ  and sγ  are scalar parameters and tu  is a standard normally distributed 
white noise disturbance. The transition probabilities can then be derived by evaluating 
the conditional cumulative distribution function for tu . Specifically, if the probability 
of the economy remaining in the crisis period at time t  once it is in crisis ( )1 1tS − = , 
given the values of tz , is p , then 
 
 
{ }
{ }
( )
1
'
0
'
| 0
Pr 1| 1,
  Pr
  1-
t t t
t z t s
u z z t s
p S S z
u z
z
γ γ γ
γ γ γ
−≡ = =
= ≥ − − −
≡ Φ − −
 (6) 
  
where ( )| .u zΦ  denotes the standard normal cumulative density function. Similarly, the 
probability of remaining in a tranquil regime at time t , given tz  and 1 0tS − =  may be 
expressed as: 
   
 
{ }
{ }
( )
1
'
0
'
| 0
Pr 0 | 0,
  Pr
  
t t t
t z t
u z z t
q S S z
u z
z
γ γ
γ γ
−≡ = =
= ≥ − −
≡ Φ −
 (7) 
 
Finally, the time-varying transition probability matrix can be expressed as: 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
' '
| 0 | 0
' '
| 0 | 01 1
u z z t u z z t s
u z z t u z z t s
z z
z z
γ γ γ γ γ
γ γ γ γ γ
⎡ ⎤Φ − Φ − −⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥−Φ − −Φ − −⎣ ⎦
 
 
It should be noted that the time-varying transition probability matrix describes 
how exogenous variables, represented here by tz , affect the path of the transition 
probability remaining in a tranquil period (which corresponds to 0tS = ). Associating 
the crisis period with state 1, p  becomes the probability of remaining under a crisis 
regime, where 1 p−  represents that of switching to a tranquil regime. In these terms, 
exogenous variables inciting currency crises are expected to boost the probability of 
remaining in a crisis regime ( )p  as well as that of switching from a tranquil to a crisis 
regime ( )1 p− . On the other hand, estimates of the parameter vector 
( )'' 20 1 0, , , , ,z sα α γ γ γ σ , together with the estimated time series for unobservable tS , 
*
tS , tp  and q , can be carried out in a Bayesian context using an application of the 
Gibbs sampler, as suggested by Filardo y Gordon (1998). 
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V.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
This section starts with an analysis of the fiscal sustainability results, in 
addition to the calculated estimates using the Markov-switching model. 
 
5.1 Sustainability Assessments 
 
To construct a Fiscal Sustainability Indicator (FSI), we use *d  equal to the lowest 
value reached by the debt ratio during the period under study. The value of  *β  
represents the median of the distribution of the observed values of β  for the group of 
developing countries. Its value was set at 1.026. This implies that the expected value 
of the real interest rate is 2.6 percentage points higher than the real growth rate, in a 
steady state. 
 
Table 1 shows the countries with problems of fiscal sustainability during 
1990Q1-2004Q4. Countries for which the FSI was above the threshold of 1 at least 
75% of the times were classified as having been fiscally unsustainable ( )1β λ− >  
during the period considered. Also, Table 1 shows the frequency of β  values being 
higher than *β , and the frequency of λ  assuming a negative value (implying primary 
deficit). In general, the developing countries in the sample present an unsustainable 
fiscal stance explained mostly by government fiscal deficit rather than spreads 
between the real interest rates and the growth rates.  
 
 
Table 1. Analysis of Fiscal Sustainability Indicators 
Country β - λ > 1 β > β* λ < 0
Argentina 87% 42% 95%
Brazil 62% 42% 60%
Chile 33% 3% 33%
Colombia 93% 37% 100%
Costa Rica 100% 2% 100%
Czech Republic 95% 20% 84%
Dominican Republic 40% 20% 40%
El Salvador 97% 3% 100%
Honduras 98% 13% 100%
Hungary 95% 30% 97%
Indonesia 50% 2% 60%
Malaysia 47% 7% 77%
Mexico 83% 18% 85%
Peru 80% 42% 93%
Phillipines 98% 10% 100%
Thailand 38% 13% 38%
Turkey 100% 50% 100%
Developing Countries 76% 21% 80%
Note: Number of quarters as a percentage of total quarters.
Source: Author's calculations.
Frequency
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In summary, Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Czech Republic, El 
Salvador, Honduras, Hungary, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines and Turkey present large 
unsustainable fiscal positions in most of the period studied, which is explained 
basically by primary fiscal deficit. 
 
The following sub-section presents a Markov-switching model with time-
varying transition probabilities. 
 
5.2 TVTP Markov-switching Model  
 
This sub-section tests whether the Fiscal Sustainability Indicator (FSI) predicts 
the switch from tranquil periods to crises episodes. The method used to estimate the 
Markov-switching model with time varying transition probabilities is the Gibbs 
sampling approach of Albert and Chib (1993)8. Gibbs sampling is an estimated and a 
simulation technique, based on the properties of Markov chains, for generating 
random variables from a distribution indirectly without having to calculate the 
density9. This methodology possesses important advantages over the maximum 
likelihood framework given that the simulation output gives much more information 
about the parameters than the maximum likelihood approach.  
 
The Bayesian Gibbs sampling approach is used to find the marginal posterior 
distributions of the parameters of the model given by equations from 2 to 7. Before 
this, it is necessary to assign initial values for some parameters; hence the Quasi 
Bayesian maximum likelihood algorithm proposed by Hamilton (1989, 1991) is used 
to estimate the priors’ parameters. The priors used are presented in Table 2. The 
parameters 2σ , 0α  and 1α , denote the variances and the means in crisis and tranquil 
periods respectively10. Then, the model using Gibbs sampling is estimated, setting the 
priors to the values obtained from the Quasi Bayesian maximum likelihood algorithm. 
The first 2000 iterations of the Gibbs sampling are discarded to ensure that 
approximate convergence is obtained. An additional 8,000 iterations are saved and 
used to draw inferences on the parameters and the switching states. We use the binary 
index of currency crises as the state variable, the Fiscal Sustainability Indicator as the 
independent and the MPI as the dependent variable.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 All results presented in this section were estimated by Bayesian methods and Gibbs sampling using a 
modified version of Filardo and Gordon (1998) code written by Martin Ellison and available at 
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/ellison/. 
9 For a detailed demonstration of Gibbs sampling see Casella and George (1992), and Albert and Chib 
(1993). 
10 In the long run initial values play no role, but good initial values can speed up the convergence of the 
Markov chain in its ergodic distribution. 
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Table 2. Priors for the Parameters 
 
Country Parameters Mean Standard Deviation
α0 -2.568 8.468
α1 15.403 8.468
α0 -1.412 1.394
α1 1.412 1.394
α0 -3.840 0.134
α1 1.770 0.134
α0 -0.717 0.932
α1 3.724 0.932
α0 -1.599 0.347
α1 1.181 0.347
α0 -0.702 2.278
α1 0.355 2.278
α0 0.800 0.800
α1 0.800 0.800
α0 -1.729 0.335
α1 1.729 0.335
α0 -0.261 0.261
α1 0.290 0.261
α0 -2.136 0.167
α1 0.545 0.167
α0 -1.173 1.139
α1 7.054 1.139
α0 -0.150 1.048
α1 0.046 1.048
α0 -0.793 5.272
α1 11.538 5.272
α0 -1.410 0.859
α1 1.410 0.859
α0 -0.211 0.257
α1 0.199 0.257
α0 -0.467 0.928
α1 0.132 0.928
α0 -2.210 5.250
α1 11.273 5.250
Note: The prior distribution of σ2 is improper.
Source: Author's calculations.
Argentina
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Czech Republic
Dominican Republic
El Salvador
Honduras
Hungary
Indonesia
Thailand
Turkey
Malaysia
Mexico
Peru
Phillipines
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Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Costa Rica Czech Rep. Dominican Rep. El Salvador Honduras Hungary Indonesia Malaysia Mexico Peru Philippines Thailand Turkey
α0 -37.19 -8.046 -29.692 -1086.0 -5.440 -12.032 -504.065 -3.044 -4.516 -39.560 -7.168 140.839 -16.883 -30.778 -4.384 -5.924 -39.068
(3.378) (4.170) (248.797) (100383.835) (1.102) (3.123) (467.242) (0.741) (816.793) (1761.187) (2.299) (8808.000) (4.186) (2.555) (5.723) (0.635) (10.370)
α1 34.126 9.819 5.112 1.138 6.704 10.936 1.873 2.749 -4.237 3.463 6.113 2.395 16.092 29.826 4.578 4.926 42.717
(3.421) (3.479) (28.052) (18.020) (1.070) (3.120) (3.425) (0.724) (239.974) (9.261) (2.514) (0.382) (4.251) (2.612) (5.794) (2.259) (5.888)
Φ1 0.048 -0.290 0.178 0.180 0.228 0.231 0.433 0.212 0.487 0.295 0.547 0.948 0.409 -0.288 0.356 0.881 0.536
Φ2 0.015 -0.050 0.051 0.199 0.062 -0.044 0.071 -0.004 0.159 -0.293 -0.204 0.010 -0.361 -0.145 -0.120
Φ3 -0.208 0.029 0.052 -0.218 0.110 0.011 -0.067 0.096 -0.142 -0.084 -0.060 0.294 0.360 0.041
Φ4 -0.005 0.133 -0.092 0.048 -0.238 -0.337 -0.361 -0.077
Φ5 -0.221
γ0 0.709 -0.017 12.124 0.315 1.284 -0.107 4.051 0.406 -0.085 0.512 0.188 -0.348 -0.127 0.399 -0.185 0.153 -0.527
(0.269) (0.327) (6.122) (0.418) (0.286) (0.441) (0.354 (0.263) (0.358) (0.314) (0.134) (0.378) (0.348) (0.291) (0.240) (0.130) (0.273)
γz 0.842 -25.355 -2.062 0.917 -0.09 2.837 -2.906 0.915 1.302 0.993 0.580 1.872 2.540 0.981 1.223 0.566 0.709
(0.054) (0.201) (0.079) (0.0890 (0.95) (0.222) (0.258) (0.103) (0.097) (0.094) (0.067) (0.141) (0.170) (0.038) (0.096) (0.074) (0.047)
γs -0.023 31.136 -9.034 0.172 0.430 -1.660 0.659 0.279 0.040 0.013 0.629 -0.053) -1.328 0.085 0.236 0.794 0.365
(0.200) (0.451) (6.060) (0.320) (0.187) (0.294) (0.349) (0.184) (0.247) (0.215) (0.164) (0.265) (0.188) (0.241) (0.161) (0.166) (0.212)
σ² 34.887 269.216 7.536 117.241 1.811 5.464 15.371 0.386 0.757 1.559 4.807 0.349 9.619 17.570 7.178 2.657 49.474
Note: Standard errors are noted in brackets below the coefficient estimates. Lags were selected according to Akaike, Hannah-Quinn and Schwarz criterion from the fixed transition probabilities used to estimate the prior parameters.
Source: Author's calculations.
Table 3. Gibbs Sampling Results for Currency Crises
 15
Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Costa Rica Czech Rep. Dominican Rep. El Salvador Honduras Hungary Indonesia Malaysia Mexico Peru Philippines Thailand Turkey
α0 -36.130 -120.430 -12.074 0.192 -5.440 -12.032 -504.065 -61.455 -217.963 -29.268 -5.145 140.839 -19.487 -30.789 -3.838 -5.922 -39.121
(3.048) (32.769) (54.270) (1.581) (1.102) (3.123) (467.242) (11707.1520) (22594.468) (5606.896) (4.990) (8808.000) (2.336) (2.580) (4.610) (0.637) (10.602)
α1 32.996 125.178 10.066 0.050 6.704 10.936 1.873 2.733 -2.704 3.887 3.596 2.392 18.997 29.836 4.138 4.924 43.263
(2.979) (32.550) (164.275) (1.731) (1.070) (3.120) (3.425) (0.883) (0.479) (2.956) (31.056) (0.382) (21.111) (2.636) (4.669) (2.260) (10.597)
Φ1 -0.128 0.165 0.144 0.163 0.228 0.231 0.433 0.211 0.331 0.111 0.691 0.948 -0.158 -0.290 0.407 0.882 0.553
Φ2 -0.056 -0.044 0.093 0.199 0.062 0.027 0.083 0.191 -0.151 -0.293 -0.074 0.009 -0.481 -0.145 -0.084
Φ3 -0.285 0.016 -0.218 0.110 -0.049 -0.277 0.071 -0.084 0.308 -0.061 0.362 0.360 -0.015
Φ4 -0.002 0.133 -0.092 0.081 0.062 0.018 -0.020 -0.346 -0.361 -0.109
Φ5 0.069 -0.221 -0.386 -0.246
γ0 0.708 3.201 1.107 -1.730 1.284 -0.107 4.051 -0.032 -0.027 1.130 0.224 -0.348 0.732 0.155 -0.693 0.154 -0.532
(0.304) (1.151) (1.068) (0.141) (0.2860 (0.441) (0.3540 (0.259) (0.162) (0.429) (0.299) (0.378) (0.429) (0.290) (0.219) (0.130) (0.226)
γz 0.922 -1.146 -0.682 2.033 -0.090 2.837 -2.906 1.389 0.987 0.832 0.728 1.872 -0.451 1.025 1.434 0.541 0.589
(0.058) (0.195) (0.188) (0.127) (0.095) (0.222) (0.258) (0.104) (0.050) (0.151) (0.129) (0.141) (0.223) (0.0380 (0.105) (0.074) (0.049)
γs -0.114 -0.109 1.938 0.079 0.430 -1.660 0.659 0.274 0.151 0.085 0.331 -0.053 1.920 0.089 0.155 0.807 0.259
(0.227) (1.009) (0.959) (0.302) (0.187) (0.294) (0.349) (0.181) (0.116) (0.235) (0.225) (0.265) (0.323) (0.239) (0.123) (0.166) (0.149)
σ² 36.339 195.927 7.243 6.825 1.811 5.464 15.371 0.402 9.514 1.161 7.242 0.349 9.183 17.661 6.795 2.657 49.143
Note: Standard errors are noted in brackets below the coefficient estimates. Lags were selected according to Akaike, Hannah-Quinn and Schwarz criterion from the fixed transition probabilities used to estimate the prior parameters.
Source: Author's calculations.
Table 4. Gibbs Sampling Results for Exchange Rate Depreciation
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The outcomes of the Gibbs sampling simulations, conducted for priors 
probabilities, are shown in Tables 3 and 4, where the means ( 0α  and 1α ) are negative 
and positive, respectively, suggesting that the phases represent tranquil and crisis 
periods. A crisis or speculative attacks are identified using the MPI as time series 
subject to discrete shifts in regimes. We assume a “tranquil” regime takes places when 
exchange rates, foreign reserves and interest rates are stable, and a “speculative” or 
“crisis” regime is characterised by large depreciations in exchange rates, foreign 
reserve falls and interest rates increments. The parameter 2σ  denotes the variances; 
zγ  is state dependent slope parameter reflecting the lagged Fiscal Sustainability 
Indicator information about the likelihood of the economy remaining in or exiting 
from a crisis period; the parameters 0γ  and sγ  determine the unconditional mean 
duration of tranquil periods and crisis regimes. It was expected that 0 sγ γ> , which 
implies that the duration of tranquil state is greater than a crisis state; and φ 's are 
autoregressive parameters. Lags were selected according to standard information 
criteria (Akaike, Hannah-Quinn and Schwarz) from the fixed transition probabilities 
used to estimate the prior parameters. The results are extremely encouraging in that all 
of the estimated coefficients are statistically significantly different from zero and their 
sign in most cases accords with our economic intuition11. Figures 4 and 5 plot the 
smoothed probabilities of currency crises against time t.  
 
The results for Argentina show that a switch into a crisis regime entails a jump 
of about 34%. With regards to the latent variable equation, the estimated coefficient 
for the Fiscal Sustainability Indicator is also strongly significant and shows, as 
expected, a positive sign. It is also found that a positive relationship between the 
probability of being in crisis and the FSI when we use the binary definition of a crisis 
from the indicator of exchange rate depreciation is used. Based on the two binary 
crisis definitions used in this section, three currency crises have been identified for 
Argentina in the period under review (see Figures 4 and 5). Parameters 0γ  and sγ  
capture the asymmetry that tranquil periods tend to last longer than crises periods. In 
contrast, the results for Brazil show that there is no positive relationship between the 
Fiscal Sustainability Indicator and currency crises. In other words, the movements of 
the FSI cannot be used to predict the switch from tranquil periods to crises states. 
Similarly, for Chile an increase in the value of the FSI reduce the probability of crises. 
At this point, it is important to point out that Brazil and Chile are not countries 
fiscally unsustainable during the period considered, according to the results in Table 
1.  
 
On the other hand, the results for Colombia show that the estimated coefficient 
Zγ  is positive, which confirms that an unsustainable fiscal position is associated with 
a higher probability of switching to a crisis period. At the same time, the parameter zγ  
has an estimated coefficient of variation of about 0.17 when we use binary currency 
crises, and about 0.30 when we use the binary exchange rate depreciation. According 
to the parameters 0γ  and sγ , tranquil periods are longer than currency crisis periods, 
but these results change when we use the exchange rate depreciation. In the case of 
Costa Rica, the results indicate that a switch into the crisis regime entails a jump of 
                                                 
11 A sensitivity analysis is performed to determine if the posterior distributions of parameters are 
invariant under various sets of priors. The results are not dependent on the priors selected. 
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about 6.7%, but there is not a positive relationship between the probability of being in 
crisis and the Fiscal Sustainability Indicator. In contrast, the TVTP Markov-switching 
model for the Czech Republic yields a high value of 1α  (about 10.9% in both cases). 
Equally, the positive sign for zγ  is consistent with the belief that an increment in the 
value of the FSI increases the probability of remaining in a crisis state and decreases 
the probability of a switch to a tranquil period. The estimated results for the 
Dominican Republic show that coefficients of zγ  are negative and tranquil periods are 
longer than crises regimes. 
 
According to the results for El Salvador, the FSI helps to predict a switch from 
tranquil periods to crisis states. The parameters zγ  are significantly positive and have 
estimated coefficients of variations of about 0.10. In this way, about three currency 
crises have been identified for El Salvador in the period under study (see Figures 4 
and 5). This country presents currency crises before adopting the US dollar as legal 
tender. While for Honduras, the parameter zγ  shows the right sign. However, the 
results do not present crisis periods. Conversely, for Hungary, the results indicate that 
there is a direct relationship between the probability of remaining in a currency crisis 
regime and the FSI. 
 
Results for Indonesia show that the mean of the regime zero is significantly 
negative, implying a tranquil regime (appreciation in currency or gains in reserves). 
While, regime one is significantly positive, indicating a crisis state (depreciation or 
losses in reserves). The positive sign in the parameter zγ  indicates that an 
unsustainable fiscal position increases the probability of being in a currency crisis 
regime. In addition, the estimated parameters 0γ  and 1γ  show that crisis period are 
longer than tranquil states. Similarly, for Malaysia the estimates indicate that there is 
a positive relationship between the Fiscal Sustainability Indicator and the probability 
of currency crises. However, the results show no tranquil periods12. It is also observed 
that using both crisis definitions leads to identical results. For Mexico, the results 
show that the probability of being in a crisis state increases as the value of the FSI 
increases. But this relationship is inversed when we use the exchange rate 
depreciation, while crisis periods are much deeper than tranquil regimes. 
 
According to the results for Peru, an increase in the Fiscal Sustainability 
Indicator decreases the probability of remaining in a tranquil period and increases the 
probability of remaining in a crisis state. Also, tranquil periods are longer than 
currency crises regimes. Similarly, the results for the Philippines indicate that the FSI 
can predict the probability of being in a currency crisis state. In addition, the 
parameters 0γ  and sγ  indicate that crises regimes are longer than tranquil periods.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 According to the results for Malaysia, it can be said that this country presents deep crisis and less 
deep crisis periods. 
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Figure 1. Smoothed Probabilities of Currency Crises 
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Note: The values of 25 and 50 correspond to the quarters of 1996.01 and 2002.02, respectively. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Figure 2. Smoothed Probabilities of Exchange Rate Depreciation 
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Note: The values of 25 and 50 correspond to the quarters of 1996.01 and 2002.02, respectively. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
In Thailand's case, the results show that there is a positive relationship 
between the FSI and currency crises. Also, the mean average duration of the crisis 
regime is almost 5 quarters. According to the estimated parameters 0γ  and sγ , crisis 
periods are longer than tranquil regimes. Similarly, for Turkey, the results indicate 
that there is a positive relationship between the probability of being in a crisis regime 
and the FSI. In addition, the parameters 0γ  and sγ  present those crises states are 
longer than tranquil periods. 
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In most cases, the estimated parameters are quite robust. The Fiscal 
Sustainability Indicator, in most countries, influences the probability of being in a 
currency crisis period. These results could reflect the nonlinear effect of lagged Fiscal 
Sustainability Indicator on currency crises. 
 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This paper addresses the issue of the leading indicators that can anticipate the 
occurrence of currency crises. None of the previous empirical studies have focused on 
whether a Fiscal Sustainability Indicator may predict a currency crisis. This work 
attempts to bridge this gap. Firstly, a Fiscal Sustainability Indicator has been 
constructed for 17 developing countries and classified the countries for which the FSI 
was above the threshold of 1 at least 76% of the time as having been fiscally 
unsustainable, and then different measures of currency crises are defined. 11 countries 
were identified as presenting large unsustainable fiscal positions in most of the period 
studied, explained basically by primary fiscal deficit.  
 
Finally, a Markov-switching method with time varying transition probabilities 
is used to test whether the FSI predicts a switch from tranquil to crises periods. 
Results suggest that in some of the countries considered, the FSI is useful in 
predicting the probabilities of being in currency crises periods. In general, major 
currency crises (such as those in South-East Asia in 1997) are well identified by the 
Markov-switching models. In the case of Chile, this country shows small periods of 
unsustainable fiscal positions. As a consequence, the Markov-switching model 
presents a negative link between these variables. The speculative pressure in the 
Chilean exchange market could be explained perhaps by contagion from Argentina 
and/or Brazil. The Markov-switching model is also very useful in determining the 
duration of currency crises periods. Expected duration of a currency crisis in 
Colombia is 1.21 quarters, while expected duration of a currency crisis in Indonesia is 
2.70 quarters. 
 
This paper contributes to the empirical literature on currency crises by 
proposing a FSI to predict currency crises and using a Markov-switching model with 
time varying transition probabilities, estimated by the Bayesian Gibbs sampling 
approach, as an alternative to more standard practice. The Fiscal Sustainability 
Indicator could act as an important early warning system. However, in light of our 
results, it has a number of limitations, mainly relating to the individual nature of most 
currency crises, where different institutional and political factors affect the crises in 
different ways. The diversity and nature of currency crises determinants reinforces the 
view that country specific models are required. Also, the absence of additional control 
variables in the TVTP model could affect the results but there is no way we can 
incorporate them in this type of model. Obviously, the analysis of only fiscal 
indicators is not enough to fully assess the probability of a currency crisis. In spite of 
these, our empirical findings seem to provide supporting evidence for some authors, 
who argue that fiscal policy plays an important role in generating currency crises. The 
definition of a currency crisis as a period characterised by the presence of intense 
foreign exchange market pressure is the best definition used. This empirical definition 
of the currency crisis generally reflects that either a large increase in the exchange rate 
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reflects only devaluation episodes or a combination of exchange rates and proxies for 
stabilising measures of the domestic currency in the general case of speculative 
attacks. 
 
For future research, it would be interesting to apply the same analysis to a 
larger sample of countries and to a higher frequency of data, such as monthly data, as 
well as the refinement of the FSI to include behavioural content that would take into 
account endogenous private savings and investment behaviour, and thereby allow 
extensions to externally financed public deficits. On the other hand, one must 
investigate whether those fiscal imbalances in developing countries reflect deeper 
structural shortcomings such as soft budget constraints and inefficient tax systems. 
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